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2ABSTRACT
The Dutch capital market is peculiar, at least because of the three following reasons.
Only a relatively small number of Dutch companies is listed at the Amsterdam Stock
Exchange, because most Dutch companies raise funds from retained earnings, bank-
credits and long term borrowing. Furthermore, the relatively small group of listed
companies is heavily dominated by a small number of large companies. Finally, the
liquidity of the stock market is relatively low and concentrated in the thirty largest funds.
Not only the structure and functioning of the stock market influences the relationship
between shareholders and company management, but also the corporate governance
structure of companies. Dutch corporate governance can be characterized as a system
aiming at balancing the interests of shareholders, management and workers. One of the
side effects of Dutch legislation at this point is that it provides Dutch companies also a
large number of measures to prevent hostile take-overs. 4 ; 5.
In this chapter, the most important information about the Dutch capital market will be
provided, as well as the most relevant legislation on corporate governance in The
Netherlands. This information provides the background for our analysis of the perception
by Dutch corporate financial managers of the short term pressures their shareholders
place upon them. We will also try to evaluate what the effects of short term pressures are
on Research and Development (R&D) policy and R&D management in Dutch companies.
A final paragraph gives a brief summary of the most important findings and discusses the
most relevant findings of our study.
3INTRODUCTION
Bavaria Brewing Company is one of the oldest and most successful family-owned
companies in The Netherlands. It has no quotation at the Amsterdam stock market and the
current owners see this as a great advantage. Ambrosius Swinkels bought the company in
1764 and his descendants made the company flourish, particularly in the period after the
Second World War. At the moment, the Bavaria Company is the second largest brewer in
The Netherlands, after Heineken, holding a 16 percent share in the Dutch beer market
and making sales of approximately 500 million US dollars in 1996. It’s current president,
Mr. P.J.J.M. Swinkels, explains Bavaria’s recent successes by its capacity to react timely
and adequately to the changing tastes of consumers in today’s turbulent beer market. In
order to cope with competition, Bavaria invested 90 million US dollars during the last
two years. These investments caused the 1995 net profit to drop from 20 to 18 million US
dollars. According to Swinkels, the stock market would not have accepted his investments
and would have reacted with a considerable reduction in the stock price. He sees a
quotation at the stock market as problematic: “In that case, I should have to devote 20 to
25 percent of my time to talking with financial analysts. Most financial experts and
investors demand much up-to-date financial information, while loosing sight of the longer
term strategy of the firm. ” (NRC, 1996).
Mr. Swinkels expresses an often heard concern for short-term pressures from the
capital market, raising the discount rate applied and/or foreshortening the time horizon of
investments. Investments are considered here all expenditures aimed at generating future
4profits. Notable examples are spending on research and development (R&D) and on
intangible assets (like training of employees and developing the brand name). Some
authors claim that stockholders, especially those in the UK and US, prefer short-term
benefits, like current profits and dividends, at the expense of future gains in order to
generate high rates of return (Jacobs, 1991; Dimsdale, 1994; Demirag, Tylecot and
Morris, 1994). This position is illustrated by pointing at the lower real cost of capital in
Japan and Germany, compared to the cost of capital in the US and UK. This may be due,
it is claimed, to the fact that in Japan large industrial conglomerates are concentrated
around one or several large banks (Keiretsu)  and that in Germany banks participate to a
great extent in firms’ equity (Sykes, 1994). The intensified links between providers of
equity (banks) and users may lower the cost of capital.
According to Hirschman’s (1970) distinction, stockholders can communicate their
discontent with company policy either by ‘voicing’ or by ‘exiting’. Voicing means using
the appropriate shareholders’ formal powers of participation in company’s decision
making bodies, like the Annual General Shareholders’ Meetings. It is generally believed
that Japanese, German and, to a lesser extend, Dutch providers of equity capital use
voicing more than exiting to influence company behaviour. The more intensive
communication between management and shareholders facilitates the exchange of private
information related to future prospects of the firm. If shareholders possess more reliable
information, they may be prepared to provide funds more cheaply and for longer periods,
permitting corporate management to invest more in the longer term, profitability of the
firm, while lessening short term pressures to generate cash for the shareholders. Some
authors claim that this explains the success of Japanese and German enterprises in
5comparison to US and UK firms (Demirag, Tylecotte & Morris, 1994; Dimsdale, 1994).
In the UK and US, shareholders are expected to use more frequently the option of
‘exiting’: they sell their shares, which can lead to lower stock prices. Lower stock prices
work in two directions: they increase the danger of a hostile takeover, and at the same
time make it difficult and expensive for undervalued companies to raise capital. The
threat of a hostile takeover can be counteracted by companies installing barriers to the
transfer of control. In Germany, public companies are allowed to issue non-voting shares
to an amount equal to that of all voting shares. thus blocking possible hostile take-overs
(Prevezer & Ricketts,  1994).
It can be argued that the short term pressure placed upon the company’s management
by its shareholders is dependent, among other factors, on the following four
circumstances: the capital structure of the fim2  (that is the balance between short term
debt, long term debt, shares and retained earnings), the composition of the firm’s
providers of equity capital (proportion provided by well informed large institutional
investors or by small private investors), the measures against hostile takeovers and
arrangements for participation of shareholders in decision making and control (provisions
for accounting, auditing and for the participation of shareholders in decision making
bodies). The first two circumstances relate to the sources of funds and the orientation of
its providers, whereas the latter two describe some important aspects of the corporate
governance structure.
As will be demonstrated, the capital structure of Dutch firms is not very distinct from
the capital structure of UK firms. There are, however, some differences in the other three
circumstances mentioned, especially in those related to corporate governance. For
6instance, Dutch companies have a large array of protectionistic measures available to
counteract hostile take-overs, of which the most noticeable is the structural law
(Structuurwet).
THE DUTCH CAPITAL MARKET
The capital structure of Dutch firms is not very different from the capital structure of
enterprises in some other OECD countries. According to OECD statistics, debt financing
comprises short-term debts to banks and others, issuing of bonds and long term loans to
third parties. As can be appreciated from table 1, the proportion of debt financing of
Dutch companies is lower than the proportion of debt financing of Italian and Japanese
companies, but higher than US companies. Quite remarkable are the relatively high
proportions short term debt financing in Japan, Italy, Germany and Belgium. In most
countries this can be attributed to the involvement of banks in financing private
enterprise. These figures also demonstrate that banks do not only participate in equity
capital (as has been claimed by Sykes, 1994) but also in providing short term loans as
well. In The Netherlands, a relatively large share of capital is provided by long term debt
financing, like in the United States. In all countries, except for the US, a tendency seems
to exist to diminish short term debt financing in favor of more long term financial
arrangements.
** INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE ** ,
The Dutch capital market can be divided into four different segments: the equity
market, where common stocks are traded, the bond market, where bonds, mortgage bonds
and bank bonds are traded, the private placements (‘over-the-counter’) market, where
conditions for capital transactions are directly negotiated between parties, and the real
estate market.
The Dutch stock market is in several respects different from other stock markets.
Only a small number of Dutch companies is listed at the Amsterdam stock exchange. In
the 1950’s a total of 500 Dutch companies was listed at the stock exchange. Mainly due
to a mergers and acquisitions wave starting in the late 1960’s,  this number has been
reduced considerably to 169 companies in 1995 (Camfferman, 1996). Most Dutch
companies, among them also large firms, are not listed. These companies raise funds
from retained earnings, bank-credits, long term borrowing from institutional investors,
capital from an international parent company, or from private placements of common
stock at friendly organizations or at co-partnering companies.
The relatively small group of listed companies is furthermore heavily dominated by a
small number of large companies. The market-value of the six biggest companies’ shares’
equals 60 % of the total market-value of the outstanding shares at the Dutch stock market
(Dorsman et.al, 1995). Most Dutch companies, especially smaller firms, seem to finance
operations by private placement of shares. This market is larger and more important than
the official stock market.
The liquidity of the stock market is relatively low, mainly concentrated in the thirty
largest funds. The ‘free float’ (the relative market-value of free tradable funds) is also
relatively low and only related to some well-known funds, like Royal Dutch Shell,
Unilever and Philips (Frijns, 1995).
8The composition of the providers of equity capital in The Netherlands is roughly as
follows: around 40 % of the shares are in hands of Dutch households and industry, some
20 % is owned by insurance companies, pensions funds and social funds, while the
remaining 40 % comes from foreign investors (see table 2).
** INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE **
At the bond market, the Dutch State, banks and insurance companies are almost the
only providers of long term bonds. One of the main reasons for the dominant position of
pension funds and insurance companies in the provision of debt capital is the postwar
legislation in social security, oblying Dutch citizens to take insurances and save money
for retirement. In turn, banks, insurance companies, and pension funds do not invest
heavily in stocks themselves. The value of common stocks in hands of institutional
investors equals 20 % of total market value in 1995 (De Nederlandsche Bank, 1996). This
is a relatively low percentage, compared with the US where 40 % and with the UK where
more than half of the stock value is in hands of institutional investors. From 1993
onwards, social and pension funds have doubled their investments in shares, holding
constant their investments in bonds. It is expected that the Dutch institutional investors
will continue investing more in common shares in the near future, given the recent
announcements that they would invest more in risk bearing securities.
CORPORATE CONTROL
Issues related to corporate control will be discussed, focusing on the Limited Liability
9Company (besloten  vennootschup: BV) and Public Limited Liability Company (naamloze
vennootschup: NV). In both the BV and NV, the two most important bodies are the
General Meeting of Shareholders and the Management Board. Dutch civil law mandates
the creation of these bodies, the creation of the Board of Directors (Supervisory Board) is
optional, except for liability companies operating under the so-called Structural Law
(Sfructuunuet).  Under the Structural Law, the creation of a Board of Directors is
mandated (we will come to the Structural Law provisions later).
By law the General Meeting of Shareholders is entitled to appoint, suspend and
discharge members of the Management Board and the Board of Directors.* The General
Meeting has the right to approve the annual report, to demand information from
management and directors, to change the statutes, to buy own shares, to decrease the
number of outstanding shares and to dissolve the company. It furthermore has all the
authorities which are not given to the other company bodies. Civil Law demands the
General Meeting of Shareholders to meet at least once a year, within six months after
conclusion of a financial year (Mendel, 1995).
The Board of Directors is mostly composed of more than one member, appointed by
the General Meeting of Shareholders (sometimes at the nomination of the meeting of
priority stock holders). The responsibility of the Board of Directors is to give advise and
to supervise the .Board  of Managers, serving the interests of the company at large. In this
quality, the board has the explicit task of representing all stakeholders, not only the
shareholders, but also the workers and management as well.
Before 1971, the General Meeting of Shareholders was entitled to appoint and dismiss
members of the Management Board and to approve the financial statements of the firm, In
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1971  the Structural Law (Structuunuet)  took effect, which legally obliges big public and
private limited liability companies to transfer these competencies to a Board of Directors.
This obligation applies to companies holding more than 25 million Dutch guilders
(equalling around 15 million US dollars) in equity-capital, employing at least 100 workers
in the Netherlands and holding the legal obligation to have a workers’ council.3
Companies under the Structuurwet  are also called ‘structural liability companies’
(structuuwennootschappen).  The main objective of the legislator was to provide workers a
greater say in the composition of and in decision making by the main bodies of the
company (Mendel, 1995). Under the structural law, no longer the General Meeting of
Shareholders appoints the members of the Board of Directors, but new members of the
Board are appointed by the Board itself by a system of co-optation. Shareholders and
workers (represented by the workers’ council) have the right of proposing candidates and
they can also veto the (intended) appointment of a member of the board of directors. The
veto will be decided upon by the Enterprise Chamber of the Court of Justice in
Amsterdam (Rietkerk, 199 1).
Some responsibilities of the Board of Directors are specified by Dutch civil law, like
the following. Important decisions with long lasting consequences for the firm, like
mergers, major investments, dismissal of larger numbers of employees and issues of new
shares, have to .be  approved by the Board of Directors (Civil Law, article 162). This
board is also entitled to approve the financial statements, while it is the only entity within
the firm holding the authority to appoint, suspend and dismiss members of the
Management Board as well as members of their own Board. Smaller, public and private
companies are not obliged to install a Board of Directors, but they have the option to do
so.
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The  Structuurwet  applies to roughly half of the listed companies at the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange. For these companies, the introduction of the Structuurwet caused a
significant shift of say from the General Meeting of Shareholders to the Board of
Directors. The intention of this law clearly is to voice the interests of more company
related parties than those of the shareholders alone (Keuning & Eppink, 1990). The same
law, however, has also some protectionistic features against hostile takeovers. If the
present directors of the target company are not willing to permit representatives of the
acquiring company to take part in their Board, they can effectively hinder the transfer of
corporate control. This makes a takeover less attractive. We will discuss protectionistic
measures more extensively in the following paragraph.
PROTECTION MEASURES TO HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
The United Kingdom and The Netherlands are the extremes on the dimension of use
of ‘protection measures’ to prevent hostile takeovers. In the UK a free takeover market is
propagated, prohibiting the use of protection measures. In contrast, Dutch firms can use a
wide array of different protection instruments to defend themselves against possible
hostile take-overs. Sir Leon Brittan (former vice-president of the European Commission)
noted:  ‘... the managements of Dutch companies have shown an extraordinary
ingeniousness in constructing devices that insulate them from the competition for
corporate governance.’ (Brittan, 1989; also cited by Rietkerk, 1991).
The Structuunvet  offers the possibility of co-option within the Board of Directors of
target companies, defending it against members from companies seeking to takeover
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corporate control. A widespread alternative protectionistic measure is the use of a trust
ofice.  The trust office is a foundation holding the shares and the corresponding voting
rights. The shareholders whose shares are in hands of the trust office receive certificates
in return. Certificates entitle shareholders to legal rights like the right to claim dividend
payments. However, the voting rights attached to the original shares remain at the trust
office. The trust office’s Board of Governors use these voting rights to influence
corporate policy in the General Shareholders’ Meeting. Legally, the majority of the
members of the trust office’s board of governors has to be unrelated to the stock issuing
company. In practice however, most governors have friendly ties to the company’s
management. Because of these ‘friendly ties’, management mostly expects the trust office
governors to be much more willing to agree with current corporate policy than individual
shareholders. The Structuunvet  and the trust office are also two common means to
obstruct possible hostile take-overs.
In addition, many more protection measures are in use to prevent a hostile takeover.
In an attempt to restrict the use of protection measures the Stock Exchange Association
issued additional funds rules which are in force from November lst, 1989 (Vereniging
voor de Effectenhandel, 1988; Rietkerk, 1991). In short, these rules provide that no firm
should use more. than two of the following protection measures:
1. Preferred @rotection)  stock: shares placed in hands of friendly shareholders, mostly
governors of a trust office. More than half of these governors has to be unrelated to
the preferred stock issuing firm.
2. Voting-trust certificates: certificates issued by trust offices, granting holders of
certificates ownership while giving the voting rights to the trust office.
3. Priority stock: shares providing holders final decision making power over appointing
managers and directors, altering statutes and issuing shares. Priority stocks can be in
the hands of managers and directors. Priority stocks cannot be used in combination
with the structural liability company (Drok, 1993).
4. Limitation of voting right per share: statutory restriction of a maximum number of,
mostly 6, votes per shareholder.
5. Joint ownership of shares: all shares of the firm are owned by a holding company,
while the shares of the holding company are quoted on the stock market. This
construction prevents shareholders of the holding company to directly interfere with
the firm. Only the holding company’s board of governors gets complete control of the
affairs of the firm.
The trust office plays a dominant role in Dutch corporate governance. The trust office
can be the owner of common shares, it can be used to hold preferred stocks or to issue
certificates. Of the 169 listed Dutch companies 96 firms (56.8 %)  have a trust fund in
which part of the shares and votes are placed. For corporate governance purposes, the
voting rights placed in trust funds are important. Table 3 contains a summary of the
voting rights in .hands of trust funds (Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer, 1995). As can
be appreciated, one-third of the trust funds has more than 33.3 % of the voting rights,
being able to block changes of statutes, which normally need a two-third majority. In case
of a threat of a hostile take-over, trust funds are capable to issue preferred stock,
permitting 37 % of the trust funds to have a two-third majority right, enabling these funds
to impose statutory changes if necessary.
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** INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE **
Besides these protection measures, a large array of other measures is also available to
protect firms from shareholders’ influence. Some of these are ‘legalistic’ protection
measures, like restriction of the voting rights of shareholders and application of special
majority rights. Others are ‘structural’ measures, like cross participations, ‘poison pills’
and ‘crown jewels’ constructions. A recent study of protection measures and laws of
mergers and acquisitions in 23 countries revealed that in the Netherlands more use is
made of ‘legalistic’ protection measures, while in Germany and France more ‘structural’
measures are used (KPMG, 1995). EC’s proposals to counteract protection measures
(alteration of the second directive and implementation of the fifth and thirteenth directive)
are primarily targeted at reducing the ‘legalistic’ protection measures.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In 1997 new legislation will take effect to counteract protection measures. This
legislation is based on a common proposal by the Stock Exchange Association (VvdE)  and
the Association of Stock Issuing Companies (VEUO, a managers’ association). In case a
shareholder owns at least 70 % of the stocks of a target company during 12 months and
yet is not able to influence company policy because of protection measures, the
shareholder then is entitled to appeal to the Amsterdam Court of Justice’s Enterprise
Chamber. This court can lift the protection measures if it comes to the conclusion that
these measures conflict with the interests of the parties involved or with the interests of
the public at large (VvdE & VEUO, 1995). The newly proposed legislation already
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provoked several reactions of interested parties. The Association of Investors (VEB) and
the large pension funds see the proposal as insufficient: they perceive the one year’s
period too long and demand stronger measures to counteract protection measures (NRC,
1995). Banks, on the other hand, announced to participate more in ‘promising’ firms,
trying to protect them against possible hostile takeovers. This would bring Dutch banks in
similar positions as the German banks are at the moment (NRC, 1995). In reaction to the
bill, several larger private firms like Hoogovens, Ahold  and DSM issued preferred stock
and placed it in hands of friendly stockholders (see also Boot, 1996). These companies
are apparently trying to install a ‘circle of friendly shareholders’ in order to discourage or
hinder third parties in trying to acquire a seventy percent share in the company. DSM
introduced in the Netherlands a unique share buy back programme. The company bought
shares back from the Dutch government for an amount of 600 million guilders. The
company converted these shares into preferred stock and placed it in hands of friendly
banks and insurance companies. The revenues of 500 million guilders payed by the
friendly shareholders were transferred to the government. Stock prices rose considerably
because of these transactions.
These events, the international debates on corporate government and the large number
of Dutch shares. in hands of foreign investors (see also table 2) called for a public debate
on the peculiarities of existing legislation and current corporate governance practice in
The Netherlands. The Investors ’ Pla$4orm  and the Association of Stock Issuing Companies
(WZJO)  installed a committee on Corporate Governance, the so-called ‘Committee
Peters’4, which published its recommendations in October 1996 (Committee Corporate
Governance in Nederland, 1996). The committee recommends that the position of the
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shareholder should be strengthened and that the Board of Directors should play a truly
independent and critical role as supervisor and adviser of the Management Board. At the
same time, the committee recognizes the value of protection measures and the Structural
Law. It therefore does not recommend to change legislation on these issues, but to
improve corporate governance practices.
The committee proposed a list of 40 practical recommendations, aimed at-improving
the functioning of the Board of Directors, The Executive Board and the General Meeting
of Shareholders and of the interplay between these three parties. Most of these
recommendations aim at strengthening the position of investors and relaxing
protectionistic measures, especially when these measures only lead to a limitation of the
shareholders’ participation while no clear and direct threat of a hostile takeover really
exists. The Board of Directors should periodically publish a public document, explaining
what the size and composition of the Board will be, how the tasks will be distributed
among its members and what working-methods will be employed. These recommendations
should be based on a thorough analysis of the position of the company.5 The Board
should also publish yearly a paragraph in the annual report about its assessment of the
company strategy, the business risks and the quality of the corporate internal control
systems. The most important recommendation is on the relationship between the company
and its shareholders. The committee invites the Management Board and the Board of
Directors of Dutch companies to evaluate the relationship with their shareholders on six
main topic?  and to report their findings as well as specific recommendations to improve
these relationships on a General Shareholders’ Meeting in 1998.
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PERFORMANCE PRESSURES
In order to assess corporate financial managers’ perception of capital market short
termism a survey was prepared, partly based on a survey by Demirag (1995). In
December 1995, after reversed translation and extensive pretesting of the questions, the
survey was sent to the controllers (or financial directors) of all 167 Dutch public firms7
listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange. Nearly 40 % returned the survey. From this
response, 82 % was usable for analysis. In our analysis, almost one third of the listed
companies from the Amsterdam Stock Exchange was included (see panel A of table 4).
Analysis of the nonresponse does not give any reason to expect that the composition of
the responding firms is biased (panel B of table 4).
** INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE **
Table 6 shows that all economic sectors in The Netherlands are represented in the
sample.
** INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE **
In order to measure managers’ perceptions of short-termist capital market pressures,
we used an instrument developed by Demirag (1995). From this eight item instrument,
four questions turned out to be highly positively correlated. These ,questions  were the
same Demirag found in his survey.
1 8
The first question attempted to determine in general terms whether it is difficult to
provide profit figures which satisfy shareholders whilst funding R&D projects which are
right for the business. The mean of 2.491 indicates that, on the whole. Dutch managers
do not perceive this issue as problematic.
The second question focuses on the concrete experiences financial managers might
have balancing short term profit maximization pressures from their owners against long
term interests of the company. It turned out that Dutch managers do not have experienced
this dilemma (mean of 2.442).
The third question relates to the position analysts and major shareholders take in
prioritizing lower-risk short-term product development over high-risk long term research.
Dutch financial managers don’t perceive analysts and major shareholders prioritise lower-
risk projects over high-risk projects, although the mean for this questions is somewhat
higher than for the other questions (2.627).
The fourth question is used to assess whether financial managers perceive their firms
to be a possible candidate for take-over. As may be expected, Dutch financial managers
do not perceive this to be the case (mean is 2.472).
The scores on the four items were added to a new and comprehensive measure of
‘short term pressure’ from shareholders (or the capital market at large) on firms as
perceived by financial managers in Dutch companies.
This new variable is a reliable measure of short term pressure, displaying a Cronbach
alpha of 0.60. Generally, lower limits around 0.50 or 0.60 are felt to be acceptable
(Nunnally , 1967).
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The data show that significant differences in ‘short term pressure’ exist between
economic sectors (F-value = 7.0013, p = 0.0023). The newly constructed variable has a
lower limit of 4 and a higher limit of 20. The overall mean for all sample firms is 10.1.
High short term pressure firms are in Consumer Goods, Transport and Communications
and Banks & other financial institutions (group mean of 11.6). Low short term pressure
firms are in Capital Goods, Insurance Companies and Mineral and Mining Industry
(group mean of 7.7). Firms experiencing medium short term pressures -are in the
remaining four sectors Basic Industry, Construction Industry, Non-financial Service
Industry and Trade (group mean of 10.2) (see table 6). These results partly confirm
Demirag’s finding of pharmaceutical and chemical firms perceiving low short term
pressures (Demirag, 1996). Most of the Dutch pharmaceutical and chemical companies
are located in the trade group and some in the basic industry group.
** INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE **
SHORT TERM PRESSURES AND CORPORATE R&D POLICY
In this section, the relationship between short termism and corporate R&D policy will
be analyzed. High short term pressure indicates that corporate management perceives their
shareholders as being more interested in short term financial results than in the longer
term prosperity of the firm. High short term pressure should therefore lead to less
investments in R&D which do not promise a good return in the short term. We will
analyze these effects, looking at different company decisions and activities on R&D,
divided into two groups, namely R&D Strategy and R&D Management. In the first group
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issues related to R&D spending and corporate policies on R&D are analyzed. In the
second group, company decisions regarding planning, budgeting and evaluation of R&D
activities will be discussed.
R&D Strategy
It is to be expected that firms perceiving high pressure from their shareholders for short
term results (which we call ‘high pressured firms’ or HPFs),  will in general invest less in
Research and Development in comparison with firms not perceiving these short term
pressures. If we use real expenditures on R&D, this hypothesis is confirmed (see table 7,
upper part). Real expenditures on R&D is a figure which cannot be used across the
companies of our sample, since differences in company size are also included in these
figures. If we express R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales, which we call R&D
intensity, no significant relation between perceived high pressure and R&D spending
appears to exist. The hypothesis can therefore not be confirmed. The difference between
these results show that in the whole larger firms perceive less short term pressure. The
Spear-man rank correlation between sales (as a measure of size) and perceived short term
pressure confirms this relationship (R2  = - 0.5161 (p < 0.0001)).
We also hypothesized that high pressured firms would also invest relatively more in
applied research than in fundamental research. The results however do not indicate a
significant relationship between ‘perceived short term pressures’ and the portion of
fundamental research to total research expenditures. This is contrary to what we expected
to find. One possible explanation is that it turns out to be difficult to indicate in practice
which research activities are fundamental in nature and which are applied. We didn’t
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provide the respondents specific clues on the distinction between applied and fundamental
research.
** INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE **
Apart from the actual expenditures on R&D, we also asked corporate financial
managers about their intentions and aspirations regarding R&D, in other words: their
R&D policy (see table 7, lower part). High pressured firms turn out not to invest heavily
in R&D, therefore it is to be expected that these firms compete not so much on innovative
product characteristics, but much more on low cost production. The results do not show a
significant relationship between ‘low cost strategy’ and high short term pressures. A good
reason for this finding could be that for either strategy, being it product innovation or low
cost production, research and development activities are indispensable.
Perhaps we should look at R&D expenditures as a whole and think of them as overhead
activities. It can be expected that high pressured firms would be more inclined to cut back
R&D expenditures in times of financial crisis than firms which are less pressured for
short term financial results. Our sample firms do not confirm this idea. A possible
explanation for this result could be that high pressured firms as well as low pressured
firms do not consider R&D exclusively as ‘overhead activities’. Both types of firms
appear to handle R&D expenditures differently from other overhead expenditures.
Another dimension of R&D activities is the time dimension: investing in R&D results
in immediate expenditures while the pay off will only  take place in a (more or less)
distant future period. It is to be expected that high pressured firms are striving more to
shorten the pay back period than low pressure firms do. The results of our sample firms
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however indicate the opposite: high pressured firms appear to believe more strongly that
innovation through acquisitions (that is: buying innovation in stead of developing it) is
less effective than innovation generated internally.
R&D Management
Corporate financial managers in the Dutch sample firms appear to be quite heavily
involved in strategic planning of R&D programmes and in setting the budget for R&D
activities. It is to be expected that corporate management of high pressure firms will even
be more involved in planning and budgeting R&D activities, because of shareholders’
demand for short term financial results. Our results indicate that this is the case for top
management’s involvement in the strategic planning of R&D programmes, but not in
budgeting of R&D activities (see table 8, upper part). A reason for this difference in
involvement could be that top management’s active participation is mostly restricted to
strategic matters, while the budgeting process is carried out mostly by financial staff and
other line managers. The results confirm active participation of top management in
planning R&D activities when high shareholders’ emphasis on short term financial results
is perceived.
Although there is no indication of top management’s direct involvement in the budgeting
process of R&D activities, it could be possible that budgeting of R&D programmes will
be carried out differently under high shareholders’ pressure than under low pressure. In
general, the most important criteria in setting R&D budgets by the sample firms were
‘company’s targets in terms of growth and marketshare’, ‘competitors’ activities’ and
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‘evaluations and financial reports on current projects’. The least important criteria were:
‘last year’s sales’. ‘last year’s budget’ and ‘the company’s cash position.’ Factor analysis
confirmed that two sets of budget criteria can be distinguished: financial criteria
(containing three criteria: ‘last year’s profit’, ‘next year’s profit forecast’ and ‘the
company’s cash position’ (eigenwaarde of 2.33) and market criteria (consisting of the two
criteria ‘company’s targets in terms of growth and marketshare’ and ‘competitors’
activities’ (eigenwaarde of 1.70). Summation of the criteria scores in each of these two
sets lead to two new factors: financial criteria (Cronbach alpha of 0.73) and market
criteria (Cronbach alpha of 0.49). It was expected that high pressure firms would pay
relatively more attention to the financial criteria than low pressure firms. Our results
indeed confirm this hypothesis: high pressure firms pay significantly more attention to
financial criteria than low pressure firms (see table 8, middle part). The increased
attention to financial criteria does however not automatically lead to lower attention to
market criteria. Our results do not show significant differences between high pressure and
low pressure firms in emphasizing market criteria. It seems that high pressure firms add
financial criteria to already existing market criteria in order to accommodate the
shareholder’s concern for short term financial results.
** INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE **
In evaluating R&D performance, we hypothesize that high pressured firms will emphasize
financial criteria more and non-financial criteria less than low pressured firms. These
hypotheses are analogous to those stated earlier for the budgeting process.
The sample firms appear to use many different criteria of which the most important are
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‘the alignment of the R&D project under review with existing R&D projects’, ‘the added
value of the R&D performance’ and ‘return on capital invested in the R&D project’.
Surprisingly, the least important criteria are ‘originality, creativity and innovativeness’
and ‘discounted cash flows.’ As with the budgeting criteria, factor analysis confirmed the
existence of two sets of evaluation criteria. The first set is labelled  financial criteria and
consists of the following four criteria: ‘pay back period’, ‘return on invested capital’,
‘added value’ and ‘discounted cash flows’ (eigenwaarde of 2.11). The second set can best
be characterized as inherent criteria, as it is composed of the following three criteria: ‘the
alignment with existing R&D projects’, ‘originality, creativity and innovativeness’ and
‘increase in market share’ (eigenwaarde is 1.69). Two new evaluation criteria were
constructed by summing the scores of the underlying criteria, leading to a financial
criteria factor (Cronbach alpha of 0.66) and a inherent criteria factor (Cronbach alpha of
0.70). Relating these two factors to perceived shareholders’ pressure for short term
financial results does not result in significant correlations (see table 8, lower part).
Apparently, both high as well as low pressured firms use financial and inherent criteria in
evaluating R&D performance. A possible explanation for this surprising result may be
that the managerial implications of the assessment of R&D performance is not as
important as the allocation decision during the budgeting process. R&D expenditures are
mostly considered as ‘discretionary costs’, for which the most relevant decision is the
decision how to allocate funds among the R&D projects available. In the assessment
process, evaluation information on R&D projects must be as divers as the many different
dimensions because of the multidimensionality of R&D outcomes and of the uniqueness of
each R&D project. Considering performance criteria after concluding the R&D project
does not seem to be managerially very useful, since no other relevant decision can be
2 5
based upon this information. Short term or longer term strategic considerations will
therefore not have great impact on the way the final assessment of concluded R&D
projects is done.
CONCLUSIONS
The amount of short term pressure corporate financial managers perceive from their
shareholders can be influenced by at least four factors: the capital structure of the firm,
the composition of the jim2’s  providers of debt capital, the measures against hostile
takeovers and arrangements for participation of shareholders in decision making and
control. In The Netherlands, most capital is provided by institutional investors and foreign
investors. It is to be expected that these investors will be quite well informed about the
longer term consequences of current (R&D-)decisions. Dutch structural law, the use of
trust offices and a wide array of provisions against hostile takeovers restrict even more
the influence of less informed or less friendly shareholders in company policy matters. It
therefore is not very surprising to notice that the corporate financial managers of the
sample firms do not perceive a high short term pressure from their shareholders.
Some differences in short term pressure however show up in our data: financial
managers of enterprises in consumer goods, transport and communications, banks and
other financial institutions perceive significant higher short term pressures from their
shareholders than firms in the capital goods, insurance companies and the mineral and
mining industry. It is striking to notice that most hypothesis about R&D strategy were not
confirmed by the results, while at the same time they did confirm some important
2 6
hypothesis related to R&D management. Apparantly , R&D policies are influenced by
many other considerations than the short term orientation investors put on corporate
financial managers. On the other hand, if shareholders requir short term financial results,
corporate managers seem to be more involved in planning R&D programmes and they
appear to put more emphasis on similar financial criteria in the preparation of the R&D
budgets.
Some hypothesis however were not confirmed by the data. One of the most striking
examples is the result that no clear correlation exists between short term pressure and
strategy in terms of low cost production versus product innovation. Apparently, for each
of these strategies R&D is needed, and short term versus long term pressures play an
equal role in both strategies. We found an analogous example in the way financial
managers see R&D expenses. We hypothesized that high pressure firms’ managers would
perceive R&D more as an overhead activity which needs to be cut back in times of
financial crisis. The results show that R&D activities are not considered differently by
high pressure firms in comparison with low pressure firms. It seems as if overall, R&D
activities are considered quite different from other ‘overhead activities’ both by low
pressure as well as by high pressure firms.
To conclude, the partly confirming results give the impression that the distinction ‘low
pressure’ versus ‘high pressure’ firms captures an important factor of the influence
shareholders may have on corporate policy, but this distinction provides only a partial
image of the complex relationship between company owners and corporate management.
It is therefore needed that we analyze more fully the different factors that are at work in
2 7
shaping this important relationship.
2 8
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TABLES
Equity and Debt of Non-financial enterprises in different OECD-countries as proportionTable 1:
of total sources (data in percentages) in 1992 and 1993
Countries 1992 1993
Equity Debt Equity Debt
Long term Short term Long term Short term
United States 49.4 34.3 16.3 47.2 30.0 22.8
Japan 32.8 22.4 44.8 33.5 23.7 42.8
Spain 38.5 23.2 38.3 37.9 25.0 37.1
Italy 23.6 22.3 54.1 22.9 24.1 53.0
Germany 38.7 16.0 45.3 38.7 16.5 44.7
Belgium 39.3 19.7 41.0 40.6 19.9 39.5
Netherlands 42.3 26.1 31.6 38.4 32.0 29.5
Sources: OECD Statistics, CBS Statistics 1995 and 1996, Sdu/uitgeverij,  ‘s-Gravenhage.
3 2
Table 2: Ownership of shares in The Netherlands (in percentages of the total value of
shares)
Owner categories 1986 1990 1994 1995
Banks 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8
Institutional investors ‘) 1 3 . 4 1 9 . 0 1 8 . 8 19.1
Foreign owners 47.2 44.0 41.8 3 9 . 3
Investment companies 1.6 1.5 1 . 2 1.3
Other ‘) 36.9 34.8 37.6 3 9 . 4
Total 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
Sources: Committee Peters, Corporate Governance in Nederland, Secretariaat  Corporate
Governance, Beursplein 5,  Amsterdam, 1996.
l): insurance companies, pension funds and social funds
*):  the remaining shares, mostly in hands of households and industry
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Table 3: Percentages of listed Dutch companies having a trust fund, according to the
voting rights exercised by them in 1994 (N = 96).
Real voting rights
Voting rights including
Dotential  rights
Less than Between Between More than Total voting
33.3 % 33.3% and 50% 50% and 66.6% 66.6 % rights
64.5 % 6.5 % 5.9 % 23.1 % 100  %
52.1 % 5.9 % 4.1 % 37.3 % 100 %
Source: Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer, 1995.
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Table 4: Analysis of the Response and Nonresponse of the survey
Panel A: Response to the Survey.
Number of Questionnaires sent 167 (100%)
Number of Questionnaires received 65 (39 %)
Number of Questionnaires used in analysis 54 (32 %)
Panel B: Analysis of the Nonresponse (n =26  (16%)).
too busy to respond 62 %
too many surveys received 8 %
information required is too 4 %
sensitive to disclose
no interest in the subject 1 5  %
illness and holidays 1 1  %
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Table 5: Distribution of sample firms according to Economic Sector
Number of Percentage of all
Economic Sector sample firms firms in sector
1 . Consumer Goods 6 2 2 %
2 . Capital Goods 4 1 6 %
3 . Basic Industry 1 0 4 2 %
4 . Construction Industry 3 2 5 %
5 . Transport and Communications 4 5 0 %
6 . Non-financial Service Industry 1 2 5 0 %
7 . Trade 1 0 2 9 %
8 . Banks & other financial institutions 2 1 8 %
9 . Insurance Companies 1 2 5 %
10. Mineral and Mining Industry 1 5 0 %
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Table 6: Means of Perceived Short Term Pressure by Economic sector
Economic Sector (number of companies) Perceived Short Term Pressure
Low Pressure Group (7) 7.7
Capital Goods (4) 8.8
Insurance Companies (2) 6.0
Mineral and Minig Industry (1) 7.0
Medium Pressure Group (30) 10.2
Basic Industry (9) 10.3
Construction Industry (3) 10.7
Non-financial Services (10) 10.3
Trade (8) 9.6
High Pressure Group (9) 1 1 . 6
Consumer Goods (5) 1 1 . 8
Transport and Communications (3) 1 0 . 7
Banks & other financial institutions (1) 1 3 . 0
All groups 10.1
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Table 7: Relationship between R&D Strategy and Shareholders’ Short Term Pressures as
perceived by Dutch Corporate Financial Managers
(Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients, significance tests between parentheses
(1 -tailed))
Hypothesis Sample size Coefficient (p-value)
R&D Expenditures ”
1 ‘High Pressured Firms’ (HPF) will have
lower expenditures on R&D
2 HPF will have lower R&D intensity’)
3 HPF will have relatively lower
expenditures on fundamental research in
comparison to applied research
R&D Policy
4 HPFs tend to place more emphasis on
costs than on product innovation
5 HPFs consider R&D more as an ‘overhead
activity’ which needs to be cut back in
times of financial crisis
4 2 - 0.4311 (0.002)
3 7 - 0.0401 (0.407)
4 4 - 0.1327 (0.195)
4 8 - 0.1586 (0.141)
4 9 - 0.0040 (0.489)
6 HPFs believe that innovation generated 4 9 0.1955 (0.089)
internally is more effective than innovation
through acquisitions
‘I:  Corporate expenditures on R&D in 1995
2): R&D intensity is calculated as ‘corporate expenditures on R&D’ divided by ‘total
sales’ (both are 1995 figures)
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Table 8: Relationship between companies’ systems of R&D Planning, Budgeting &
Performance Evaluation and Shareholders’ Short Term Pressures as perceived
by Dutch Corporate Financial Managers
(Spear-man Rank Correlation Coefficients, significance tests between parentheses
(1  -tailed))
Hypothesis Sample size Coefficient (p-value)
R&D Planning
1 HPFs involve top management actively in 4 9 0.2579 (0.037)
strategic planning of R&D programmes
2 HPFs involve top management actively in 4 8 0.0238 (0.436)
budgeting for R&D activities
R&D Budgeting
3 HPFs place more emphasis on financial 4 6 0.2854 (0.027)
criteria (like last year’s profit, next year’s
profit forecast and the firm’s current cash
position) in setting the R&D budget
4 HPFs place less emphasis on market 4 7 0.0357 (0.406)
criteria (like sales growth, market share
and the competitiors’  positions) in setting
the R&D budget
Evaluation of R&D Performance
5 HPFs place more emphasis on financial 4 4 - 0.1042 (0.251)
criteria while evaluating R&D performance
6 HPFs place less emphasis on creativity, 4 6 0.0240 (0.437)
market success and alignment with existing
activities while evaluating R&D
performance
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NOTES
1. These companies are (in order of size): Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, Royal Telecom
Company (KPN), ING-Group, ABN-AMRO bank and Philips.
2. The General Meeting of Shareholders’ right to appoint members of the Management Board
and the Board of Directors can however be limited. Provisions in the statutes may give the
right of nomination to a priority shareholders’ meeting. Civil Law also permits other
(external) parties, for instance the Dutch State, to appoint up to a third of the members of the
Board of Directors.
3. A company is legally obliged to install a workers’ council if the company employs more at
least 100 workers, or if the company employs at least 35 workers for at least one third of a
full-time position.
4 . This committee was named after its president, drs. J .F.M. Peters, who is former president of
the Dutch insurance company AEGON. The committee was composed of three
respresentatives  of the the Association of Stock Issuing Companies (VEUO), three members
representing investors (including intstitutional investors), three experts on corporate
governance, two representatives of the Amsterdam stock exchange, a counseler  and an
independent chairman.
5. In this analysis explicit attention should be given to the technological and financial
innovations, the nature of the core business of the company, the globalization of its activities,
and medium- as well as longterm business risks.
6. These topics are: (1) company strategy, including growth scenario, the presence in specific
branches of industry, risk profile and profit level; (2) major changes in nature and size of the
corporation; (3) dividend policy; (4) size and composition of shares; (5) changes in company
statutes; (6) approval of annual reports.
7 . Two investment funds are seperately listed at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange while belonging
to the same (listed) investment firm. These two funds were excluded from the survey,
preventing duplication of data.
